Chaim
221975fe23
הרצת-סקריפט-מ-UI ב-/scripts, רק לסקריפטי קריאה-בלבד/אודיט, דרך גשר-המארח
הקיים (court-fetch) — שיכפול דפוס /adapter-migration.
אבטחה:
- allowlist בצד-המארח (services/script_runner.py, מקור-אמת יחיד): name→argv
קבוע ובטוח. 5 סקריפטים מאומתים: leak_guard, check_undefined_names,
storage_leak_tripwire, audit_training_corpus, audit_corpus_integrity --no-notify.
- הגשר (court_fetch_service/server.py): endpoint POST /run-script, Bearer-auth,
ולידציית-allowlist, create_subprocess_exec (ללא shell), timeout 600s,
audit-log; מתעלם מארגומנטים מהבקשה (argv מה-allowlist בלבד).
- קונטיינר (web/app.py): POX /api/scripts/{name}/run proxy ל-גשר + pre-check
allowlist; הרחבת /api/scripts/catalog ב-runnable_scripts.
- UI: כפתור "הרץ" (ירוק) רק לשורות-runnable + דיאלוג-פלט (exit-code+stdout);
שאר השורות "מקור" בלבד. confirm לפני הרצה.
מאושר דרך שער-העיצוב (מוקאפ 16-scripts עודכן עם כפתור "הרץ").
G12: leak_guard עובר (אין סמלי-פלטפורמה בשכבת-האינטליגנציה).
Deploy דו-שלבי: גשר-המארח דורש git pull בעותק-המארח + pm2 restart
legal-court-fetch-service; הקונטיינר נפרס דרך Coolify כרגיל.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
51 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
51 lines
2.2 KiB
Python
"""Allowlist of read-only scripts runnable from the /scripts page (#4).
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Single source of truth shared by BOTH:
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- the host bridge (``court_fetch_service.server`` — the ENFORCER that actually
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launches the process), and
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- the container API (``web/app.py`` — display-only: tells the UI which rows get
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a "הרץ" button).
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Each entry maps a script's basename to the EXACT, fixed argument list it runs
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with. **Read-only / audit scripts only**, with a safe fixed argv and **no
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user-supplied arguments** — never ``--apply``/``--force``. The system is
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single-user/internal, so this allowlist is a footgun-guard, not an auth boundary;
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enforcement lives on the trusted host side.
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Adding an entry is a security decision: verify the script is read-only (no DB
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writes, no destructive side effects) with the given argv before listing it.
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stdlib-only on purpose, so the lightweight host bridge can import it cheaply.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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_REPO = "/home/chaim/legal-ai"
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_PYTHON = f"{_REPO}/mcp-server/.venv/bin/python"
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# basename → argv tail (script path relative to the repo root, then fixed flags).
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# Verified read-only 2026-06-17. `audit_corpus_integrity` runs with --no-notify
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# so it stays report-only (no notification side-effect) when run from the dashboard.
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SCRIPT_RUN_ALLOWLIST: dict[str, list[str]] = {
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"leak_guard.py": ["scripts/leak_guard.py"],
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"check_undefined_names.py": ["scripts/check_undefined_names.py"],
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"storage_leak_tripwire.py": ["scripts/storage_leak_tripwire.py"],
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"audit_training_corpus.py": ["scripts/audit_training_corpus.py"],
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"audit_corpus_integrity.py": ["scripts/audit_corpus_integrity.py", "--no-notify"],
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}
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def runnable_names() -> list[str]:
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"""Sorted basenames the UI may show a "הרץ" button for (display-only)."""
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return sorted(SCRIPT_RUN_ALLOWLIST)
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def build_argv(name: str) -> list[str] | None:
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"""Full argv (python + absolute script path + fixed flags) for an allowlisted
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script, or ``None`` when *name* is not allowlisted. Arguments are taken ONLY
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from the allowlist — anything the caller passes is ignored."""
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tail = SCRIPT_RUN_ALLOWLIST.get(name)
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if tail is None:
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return None
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return [_PYTHON, f"{_REPO}/{tail[0]}", *tail[1:]]
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