security(chat): bind chat service to docker bridge + require Bearer auth

Address security-review finding: the host-side legal-chat-service was
binding 0.0.0.0:8770 with no authentication. The service spawns the
claude CLI, whose tool set includes Bash + Edit — so an unauthenticated
/chat/start is effectively RCE. Oracle Cloud's security list closes the
port externally, but defense-in-depth requires two independent layers:

1. Bind defaults to 10.0.1.1 (docker0 bridge gateway). Reachable from
   containers on docker bridges (the legal-ai container has a route via
   the coolify network), invisible to anything outside the host. The
   --host flag is still configurable for local-dev (127.0.0.1) or
   special-case deployments, but 0.0.0.0 is explicitly discouraged in
   the docstring.
2. /chat/start requires Authorization: Bearer <LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET>.
   The secret is loaded from /home/chaim/.legal-chat-service.env (chmod
   600, off-repo) by the pm2 ecosystem and mirrored as a Coolify env
   var so the FastAPI chat_proxy sends a matching header. hmac.compare_digest
   prevents timing oracles. /health stays unauthenticated (static OK,
   no subprocess) so the FastAPI proxy can probe liveness without the
   secret.

The service refuses to start if LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET is empty or
shorter than 24 chars — no silent fallback to an open mode.

When the Infisical MCP comes back, migrate the secret into the vault
at /_GUIDELINES per the project secrets policy.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>

mcp-server/src/legal_mcp/chat_service/server.py

@@ -4,18 +4,33 @@ Endpoints:
     POST /chat/start    — body: {prompt, system?, resume_session_id?}
                           returns SSE stream of events from
                           ``claude_session.query_streaming``.
-    GET  /health        — liveness probe.
+                          REQUIRES Authorization: Bearer <secret>.
+    GET  /health        — liveness probe (no auth — used by FastAPI for status).
 
 Run with pm2:
-    pm2 start ecosystem.config.cjs --only legal-chat-service
+    pm2 start scripts/legal-chat-service.config.cjs
 
 Standalone for dev:
     cd ~/legal-ai/mcp-server
-    .venv/bin/python -m legal_mcp.chat_service.server --port 8770
+    LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET=... .venv/bin/python -m legal_mcp.chat_service.server \
+        --port 8770 --host 10.0.1.1
 
-We intentionally bind to 127.0.0.1 only — the FastAPI container reaches
+Security posture
-us via ``host.docker.internal``, and exposing the bridge publicly would
+----------------
-let anyone run claude CLI commands against Daphna's session.
+1. Bind defaults to ``10.0.1.1`` — the host's docker0 bridge gateway.
+   Containers on docker bridges (including the legal-ai container, which
+   sits on the ``coolify`` network but routes to docker0 at the host)
+   can reach this address; processes outside the host cannot. Binding to
+   ``0.0.0.0`` is permitted but discouraged (relies on the cloud-level
+   firewall as the sole perimeter).
+2. ``/chat/start`` requires a ``Authorization: Bearer <LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET>``
+   header. The secret is loaded from the environment; without it set,
+   the server refuses to start (no fallback to "open" mode, by design —
+   the claude CLI it spawns can run arbitrary tool calls, so an
+   unauthenticated /chat/start is RCE-equivalent).
+3. ``/health`` is intentionally unauthenticated so the FastAPI proxy
+   can probe liveness with no token. It returns only a static OK and
+   never spawns subprocesses, so it can't be abused.
 """
 
 from __future__ import annotations
@@ -42,10 +57,31 @@ from legal_mcp.services import claude_session  # noqa: E402
 logger = logging.getLogger("legal_chat_service")
 
 
+# Loaded once at startup. Validated to be non-empty in main(); the handler
+# uses a constant-time compare to avoid timing oracles on a short input.
+_SHARED_SECRET: str = ""
+
+
 async def health(request: web.Request) -> web.Response:
     return web.json_response({"ok": True, "service": "legal-chat-service"})
 
 
+def _check_bearer(request: web.Request) -> web.Response | None:
+    """Validate ``Authorization: Bearer <secret>``. Returns 401 response on failure."""
+    auth = request.headers.get("Authorization", "")
+    expected = "Bearer " + _SHARED_SECRET
+    # ``compare_digest`` defends against timing attacks. Strings of different
+    # length still leak length, but for a 43-char urlsafe token that's
+    # uninteresting and the auth scheme prefix anchors it anyway.
+    import hmac
+    if not auth or not hmac.compare_digest(auth, expected):
+        return web.json_response(
+            {"error": "unauthorized: missing or invalid Bearer token"},
+            status=401,
+        )
+    return None
+
+
 async def chat_start(request: web.Request) -> web.StreamResponse:
     """Drive ``claude_session.query_streaming`` and forward events as SSE.
 
@@ -55,6 +91,10 @@ async def chat_start(request: web.Request) -> web.StreamResponse:
         resume_session_id: str | None  — continue a prior CLI session
         timeout: int = 3600            — hard timeout for the subprocess
     """
+    unauth = _check_bearer(request)
+    if unauth is not None:
+        return unauth
+
     try:
         body = await request.json()
     except json.JSONDecodeError:
@@ -124,9 +164,15 @@ def build_app() -> web.Application:
 def main() -> int:
     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="legal-chat-service")
     parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=8770)
-    parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1",
+    parser.add_argument(
-                        help="bind address; 127.0.0.1 keeps the service "
+        "--host", default="10.0.1.1",
-                             "loopback-only — leave it alone in production")
+        help=(
+            "bind address. Default 10.0.1.1 = docker0 bridge gateway — "
+            "reachable from containers, invisible to non-host networks. "
+            "Use 127.0.0.1 for host-local dev; do not bind 0.0.0.0 "
+            "without a separate perimeter firewall."
+        ),
+    )
     parser.add_argument("--log-level", default="INFO")
     args = parser.parse_args()
 
@@ -135,7 +181,27 @@ def main() -> int:
         format="%(asctime)s %(name)s %(levelname)s %(message)s",
     )
 
+    secret = os.environ.get("LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET", "").strip()
+    if not secret:
+        logger.error(
+            "LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET is empty; refusing to start. "
+            "Set it in /home/chaim/.legal-chat-service.env (loaded by "
+            "pm2) and mirror it as a Coolify env var on the legal-ai app."
+        )
+        return 2
+    if len(secret) < 24:
+        logger.error(
+            "LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET is too short (got %d chars); "
+            "refusing to start. Use >=32 chars (e.g. python3 -c "
+            "'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(32))').",
+            len(secret),
+        )
+        return 2
+    global _SHARED_SECRET
+    _SHARED_SECRET = secret
+
     app = build_app()
+    logger.info("legal-chat-service listening on %s:%d", args.host, args.port)
     web.run_app(app, host=args.host, port=args.port, print=lambda _msg: None)
     return 0
 

scripts/legal-chat-service.config.cjs

@@ -2,6 +2,16 @@
  * pm2 ecosystem entry for legal-chat-service — the host-side SSE bridge
  * to ``claude`` CLI that powers the /training chat tab.
  *
+ * Security: the service spawns the claude CLI on behalf of any caller
+ * that hits /chat/start. claude tools include Bash, Read, Edit — so an
+ * unauthenticated request to /chat/start is effectively RCE-equivalent.
+ * Two defenses, both required:
+ *   1. Bind to 10.0.1.1 (docker0 bridge gateway) — only host + containers
+ *      on docker bridges can reach the socket; nothing outside the host.
+ *   2. Bearer token auth — secret loaded from /home/chaim/.legal-chat-service.env
+ *      (chmod 600) and mirrored in Coolify as LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET.
+ * The service refuses to start without the secret set.
+ *
  * Why pm2:
  *   - Auto-restart if the process dies (claude CLI subprocess failures
  *     should never leave the service in a half-dead state).
@@ -13,38 +23,47 @@
  *     pm2 save
  *
  * Smoke test:
- *     curl http://127.0.0.1:8770/health
+ *     curl http://10.0.1.1:8770/health
  *     # → {"ok":true,"service":"legal-chat-service"}
  *
  * Update:
- *     pm2 restart legal-chat-service
+ *     pm2 restart legal-chat-service --update-env
  *
  * Stop:
  *     pm2 stop legal-chat-service
  */
+const fs = require("fs");
+
+// Load LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET from a chmod 600 file off the repo.
+// The same value is mirrored in Coolify as the LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET
+// env var so the FastAPI proxy sends a matching Authorization header.
+// Migrate to Infisical (/_GUIDELINES) once the MCP server is back.
+const ENV_FILE = "/home/chaim/.legal-chat-service.env";
+const env = {
+  HOME: "/home/chaim",
+  PATH: "/home/chaim/.local/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin",
+  PYTHONUNBUFFERED: "1",
+};
+try {
+  const text = fs.readFileSync(ENV_FILE, "utf8");
+  for (const line of text.split("\n")) {
+    if (!line || line.trim().startsWith("#")) continue;
+    const m = line.match(/^\s*([A-Z_][A-Z0-9_]*)\s*=\s*(.*?)\s*$/);
+    if (m) env[m[1]] = m[2];
+  }
+} catch (e) {
+  console.error(`legal-chat-service: failed to load ${ENV_FILE}: ${e.message}`);
+  console.error("Service will refuse to start without LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET.");
+}
 
 module.exports = {
   apps: [
     {
       name: "legal-chat-service",
       cwd: "/home/chaim/legal-ai/mcp-server",
-      // Run the in-package server via the venv interpreter so all
-      // imports (claude_session, etc) resolve.
       script: "/home/chaim/legal-ai/mcp-server/.venv/bin/python",
-      // Bind to 0.0.0.0 so the legal-ai container can reach the service
+      args: "-m legal_mcp.chat_service.server --port 8770 --host 10.0.1.1",
-      // via the docker bridge gateway (10.0.1.1:8770). Oracle Cloud's
+      env,
-      // security list keeps port 8770 closed to the public internet;
-      // ufw is inactive but iptables INPUT default ACCEPT is fine here
-      // because the cloud-level firewall is the actual perimeter (same
-      // pattern paperclip uses for its 0.0.0.0:3100 binding).
-      args: "-m legal_mcp.chat_service.server --port 8770 --host 0.0.0.0",
-      // claude CLI looks up credentials under HOME — make sure it
-      // sees Daphna's session, not an empty container HOME.
-      env: {
-        HOME: "/home/chaim",
-        PATH: "/home/chaim/.local/bin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin",
-        PYTHONUNBUFFERED: "1",
-      },
       restart_delay: 5000,
       max_restarts: 10,
       autorestart: true,

web/chat_proxy.py

@@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ CHAT_SERVICE_URL = os.environ.get(
 )
 CHAT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_S = float(os.environ.get("CHAT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_S", "3600"))
 
+# Shared secret for ``Authorization: Bearer ...`` to the chat service.
+# The host-side service refuses any /chat/start without a matching token,
+# so the network bind + the bearer check are two layers of defense
+# against an attacker who reaches the docker bridge.
+_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET = os.environ.get("LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET", "").strip()
+
 
 _SSE_HEADERS = {
     "Cache-Control": "no-cache, no-transform",
@@ -92,6 +98,17 @@ async def stream_chat_message(
         "resume_session_id": conv.get("claude_session_id"),
     }
 
+    # Surface a clean error if the secret wasn't injected — better than a
+    # silent 401 dribbling out of the proxy.
+    if not _CHAT_SHARED_SECRET:
+        raise HTTPException(
+            500,
+            "LEGAL_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET is not set in the container env. "
+            "Add it as a Coolify env var matching the value in "
+            "/home/chaim/.legal-chat-service.env on the host.",
+        )
+    headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {_CHAT_SHARED_SECRET}"}
+
     async def proxy_stream() -> AsyncIterator[bytes]:
         accumulated_text: list[str] = []
         events_log: list[dict] = []
@@ -108,6 +125,7 @@ async def stream_chat_message(
                     "POST",
                     f"{CHAT_SERVICE_URL}/chat/start",
                     json=payload,
+                    headers=headers,
                 ) as upstream:
                     if upstream.status_code != 200:
                         body = await upstream.aread()